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Abstract
Rapid technological advancements in Artificial Intelligence (AI), as well as the growing
deployment of intelligent technologies in new application domains, have generated serious
anxiety and a fear of missing out among different stake-holders, fostering a racing narrative.
Whether real or not, the belief in such a race for domain supremacy through AI, can
make it real simply from its consequences, as put forward by the Thomas theorem. These
consequences may be negative, as racing for technological supremacy creates a complex
ecology of choices that could push stake-holders to underestimate or even ignore ethical
and safety procedures. As a consequence, different actors are urging to consider both the
normative and social impact of these technological advancements, contemplating the use
of the precautionary principle in AI innovation and research. Yet, given the breadth and
depth of AI and its advances, it is difficult to assess which technology needs regulation and
when. As there is no easy access to data describing this alleged AI race, theoretical models
are necessary to understand its potential dynamics, allowing for the identification of when
procedures need to be put in place to favour outcomes beneficial for all. We show that,
next to the risks of setbacks and being reprimanded for unsafe behaviour, the time-scale in
which domain supremacy can be achieved plays a crucial role. When this can be achieved
in a short term, those who completely ignore the safety precautions are bound to win the
race but at a cost to society, apparently requiring regulatory actions. Our analysis reveals
that imposing regulations for all risk and timing conditions may not have the anticipated
effect as only for specific conditions a dilemma arises between what is individually preferred
and globally beneficial. Similar observations can be made for the long-term development
case. Yet different from the short-term situation, conditions can be identified that require
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the promotion of risk-taking as opposed to compliance with safety regulations in order
to improve social welfare. These results remain robust both when two or several actors
are involved in the race and when collective rather than individual setbacks are produced
by risk-taking behaviour. When defining codes of conduct and regulatory policies for
applications of AI, a clear understanding of the time-scale of the race is thus required, as
this may induce important non-trivial effects.
1. Introduction
Interest in AI has exploded in academia and businesses in the last few years. This ex-
citement is, on the one hand, due to a series of superhuman performances generated by
particular breakthrough technologies (Silver et al., 2017; Brown & Sandholm, 2018; Silver
et al., 2018; Brown & Sandholm, 2019). Although successful in highly specialised tasks,
these AI success stories appear in the imagination of the general public as well as many
media, as Hollywood-like Artificial General Intelligence (AGI), able to perform a broad set
of intellectual tasks while continuously improving itself, generating thus unrealistic expec-
tations and unnecessary fears (Cave & Dihal, 2019). On the other hand, this excitement is
further promoted by political and business leaders alike, for both anticipate important gains
from turning previously idle data into active assets within business plans (PwC, 2017). All
these (un)announced business, societal and political ambitions reveal a certain level of anx-
iety, driving these stake-holders to quickly jump on an accelerating wagon just to make sure
they will not stay behind. This anxiety is further stimulated by an AI race narrative (AI-
Roadmap-Institute, 2017; Cave & ÓhÉigeartaigh, 2018; Apps, 2019; Cave, Dihal, & Dillon,
2020), where stake-holders in both private and public sectors are allegedly competing in an
arms-race to lead the development and deployment of powerful, transformative AI (Arm-
strong, Bostrom, & Shulman, 2016; Baum, 2017; Bostrom, 2017; Cave & ÓhÉigeartaigh,
2018; Lee, 2018).
Irrespectively of the reality of such a race, whose existence and terms are contested
(Dignum, Muller, & Theodorou, 2020; Sotala & Yampolskiy, 2014; Lee, 2018; Cave &
ÓhÉigeartaigh, 2018), there exist indeed, even if not within a global race towards an AGI,
several salient competition races to the market, regarding elaborate AI tools of wide-ranging
use, for example, sophisticated flexible image recognition, natural speech and language un-
derstanding and interaction, or a combination of vision and language (Taddeo & Floridi,
2018; Lee, 2018). Consequently, many actors have urged for due diligence as i) these AI
systems can also be employed for more nefarious activities, e.g. espionage and cyberterror-
ism (Taddeo & Floridi, 2018) and ii) whilst attempting to be the first/best, some ethical
consequences as well as safety procedures may be underestimated or even ignored (Arm-
strong et al., 2016; Cave & ÓhÉigeartaigh, 2018) (notwithstanding the issue that certain
claims about achieving AGI may be overly optimistic or just oversold). These concerns are
highlighted by the many letters of scientists against the use of AI in military applications
(Future of Life Institute, 2015, 2019), the blogs of AI experts requesting careful communi-
cations (Brooks, 2017) and the proclamations on ethical use of AI in the world (Montreal
Declaration, 2018; Steels & Lopez de Mantaras, 2018; Russell et al., 2015; Jobin, Ienca, &
Vayena, 2019; European Commission, 2020).
While potential AI disaster scenarios are many (Sotala & Yampolskiy, 2014; Armstrong
et al., 2016; Pamlin & Armstrong, 2015; Schubert, Caviola, & Faber, 2019), the uncer-
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tainties in accurately predicting these risks and outcomes are high (Armstrong, Sotala, &
ÓhÉigeartaigh, 2014). As put forward by the Collingridge Dilemma, the impact of a new
technology is difficult to predict unless large steps have been taken in its development and
it becomes generally adopted (Collingridge, 1980). Sufficient data is therefore not yet avail-
able, requiring a modelling approach to grasp what can be expected in a race for domain
supremacy through AI (DSAI). Models provide dynamic descriptions of the key features of
this race (or parts thereof) allowing one to understand what outcomes are possible under
certain conditions and what may be the effect of policies that aim to regulate the race.
Especially, this latter issue is important as regulations are put into place for a race that
may not even exist, producing outcomes that were actually not intended in the first place.
To realise such ambitions, one first needs a baseline model that describes the racing dy-
namics and how its parameters control the observations, which is the main ambition of this
manuscript.
The idealised model proposed here models the decision-process of each race participant
where she can choose between unsafe or safe development (or deployment) of AI technology
steps to reach DSAI and discusses when this may become disruptive, i.e. when social welfare
is harmed. The model reveals when (and when not) regulations may be required and what
actions should be stimulated to promote social welfare. It thus provides a tool useful for re-
searchers and practitioners in law and technology, on the one hand, and researchers involved
in topics related to AI policy-making, on the other hand, to understand the implications
and the necessity of the regulations they intend to propose (see also Lessons-learned box ).
For instance, the model can be employed to evaluate the impact of regulatory mechanisms
like rewards for safety compliance or fines for unsafe actions on the behavioural preferences.
We resort to the framework of evolutionary game theory (EGT) (Smith, 1982; Hofbauer &
Sigmund, 1998; Sigmund, 2010) to define the model. Note that even though the focus here is
on AI technology, the proposed model is generally applicable to many competitive situations
wherein a winner-take-all scenario is possible, which includes all technological innovation
developments and patent races where there is a significant advantage to be achieved by
reaching a target first (Denicolò & Franzoni, 2010; Campart & Pfister, 2014; Lemley, 2012).
Other domains include pharmaceutical development where firms could try to cut corners
by not following safe clinical trial protocols in an effort to be the first to develop a pharma-
ceutical produce (e.g. consider the current race for a COVID-19 vaccine), in order to take
the highest possible share of the market benefit (Abbott, Dukes, & Dukes, 2009); Besides
tremendous economic advantage, a winner of such a vaccine race can also gain significant
political and reputation influence (Burrell & Kelly, 2020).
Concretely, the model assumes that in order to achieve DSAI in a domain X, a number
of development steps or rounds are required. We assume, upon completion of each round,
that there is a probability ω that yet another development round is required to reach
DSAI—which results in an average number W = (1−ω)−1 of rounds per competition/race
(Sigmund, 2010). It is thus important to understand that, while the average time-scale
of development to reach DSAI can be defined, there is no explicit finish line in the model
proposed here. Large-scale surveys and analysis of AI experts on their beliefs and predictions
about progress in AI suggest that the perceived time-scale for DSAI is highly diverse across
domains and regions (Armstrong et al., 2014; Grace et al., 2018). The model therefore aims
to capture these different time-scales of DSAI occurrence: When W is small, DSAI can be
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expected to happen in the near future (early DSAI regime) while when W is large, DSAI
will only be achieved far away in time (late DSAI regime).
Because this is a race, each participant acts by herself during each step in order to reach
the target and differs in the speed (s) with which she can complete each of the subtasks.
The race thus consists of multiple rounds and the fastest participant will reap the benefit (b)
at each round when she finishes before the others, winning the ultimate prize (B  b) once
she carries out the final step achieving DSAI in the domain X. When multiple participants
reach the end of an intermediate round or the final target at the same time they share the
benefits, i.e. b and B, respectively. Other factors could play a role into why a participant
wins, e.g. access to more qualified staff or larger budgets to start with. As we propose here
a baseline/idealised model, we assume that all participants arrive at the start with equal
wealth and resources. We focus here specifically on the choice of acting safely or not in
trying to achieve DSAI in a domain first. Future variations of this model can then explore
the impact of these additional characteristics and how they influence outcomes.
In this race, higher s may only be achievable by cutting corners, implying that some
ethical or safety procedures are ignored. It takes time and effort to comply to precautionary
requirements or acquire ethical approvals. Following a safe development process is thus not
only more costly, it also results in a slower development speed. One can therefore consider
that i) participants in the race that act safely (SAFE) pay a cost c > 0, which is not paid
by participants that ignore safety procedures (UNSAFE) and ii) the speed of development
of UNSAFE participants is faster (s > 1), compared to the speed of SAFE participants
being normalised to s = 1. So essentially a SAFE player needs W rounds (on average) to
complete the task, whereas an UNSAFE player will only need W/s.
Yet, UNSAFE strategists may suffer a personal setback or disaster during the race,
losing the acquired payoffs. Concretely, a disaster or setback, removes the intermediate (b)
and final (B) gains (see earlier) with a certain probability. The risk is personal for UNSAFE
players in the current model. Although the threat is greater for the creator (Armstrong
et al., 2016; Pamlin & Armstrong, 2015), there may also be repercussions for the other
participants or society as a whole, a matter discussed in detail in the Appendix. As will
be shown, this extension of spreading repercussions does not influence the results discussed
in the next sections. The probability that the personal setback occurs is denoted by pr
and assumed to increase linearly with the frequency the participant violates the safety
precautions. For example, if a participant always plays SAFE then disaster will not occur,
given that (
|UNSAFE |
|SAFE |+ |UNSAFE |
)
pr = 0,
with |UNSAFE | and |SAFE | indicating the number of SAFE and UNSAFE actions respec-
tively. A participant that only performs SAFE actions half of the time will incur only half
of the risk of disaster over all rounds. The way we define the probability for a setback of
disaster assumes that the risk is part of the development process and is thus not exter-
nal: It is a direct function of the UNSAFE actions taken by the participants. We discuss
implications of this assumption later on.
Finally, the model incorporates the possibility that an UNSAFE player is found out at
each step of the race, which is an additional risk for UNSAFE players that corresponds
to a simple form of regulation. We therefore assume that with some probability pfo those
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playing UNSAFE might be detected and their unsafe behavior disclosed, leading to 0 payoff
in that round.
Given these different characteristics of the DSAI Race (DSAIR) model, we can now
explore which strategies, involving SAFE an UNSAFE actions, are dominant under which
conditions, i.e. the parameters defined by this model. Since we resort to EGT to answer
this question, we consider a population of size Z in which players engage in a pairwise (or
N -player) race. Each player can choose to consistently follow safety precautions (denoted
by AS, the SAFE players) or completely ignore them (denoted by AU, the UNSAFE
players). Additionally, we assume that, upon realising that UNSAFE players ignore safety
precautions to gain a greater development speed, leading to the wining of the prize B
(and a larger share of the intermediate benefit in each round, b, especially in the regime of
weak monitoring or low pfo), SAFE players might adopt unsafeness as well to avoid further
disadvantage. It is indeed observed that competing countries or companies might engage
in such a safety corner-cutting behaviour in deploying unsafe AI to avoid falling behind
(Apps, 2019). We therefore consider, in line with previous literature on repeated games
(Axelrod, 1984; Nowak & Sigmund, 1993; Sigmund, 2010; Han, Pereira, & Santos, 2011;
Van Segbroeck et al., 2012), a conditional strategy (denoted by CS), which plays SAFE in
the first round and then adopts the move its co-player used in the previous round. This so-
called direct reciprocity strategy has been shown to promote cooperation in the context of
repeated social dilemmas, outperforming consistently defective individuals (Axelrod, 1984;
Sigmund, 2010). Alternative strategies can be imagined but for the sake of simplicity we
focus (for now) on these three.
Importantly, our modelling approach seeks for a balance between the complexities of
AI governance and the abstraction power that an idealised model of a technological race
may offer. Such abstraction, however, should not be seen as an argument for oversimplified
visions where all technological races are perceived as equivalent. Instead, the aim is to
identify some of the key elements of the social dilemmas pertaining an idealised AI race,
despite the specificities of each particular AI product and application, and different visions
on the problem. Moreover, our insights into when regulatory requirements are necessarily
related to the impact of the few factors (translated into different parameters) included in
the model, and not their whole interplay with many others which may be included in fu-
ture iterations of this framework. With this disclaimer in mind, in the following we will
examine, across different time-scales of the DSAIR, under which conditions (for instance,
regarding the disaster probability), safety behaviour should be promoted or externally en-
forced. Similarly, we address when one should omit the safety precautions for a larger social
welfare to arise faster, when the benefits gained in doing so exceed the risk of a setback
or personal disaster. Moreover, given the first-mover advantage of UNSAFE players in the
race to AI -driven domain supremacy (i.e., acquire B), we will examine whether (and under
what time-scale of the DSAIR model) conditional behaviours can still act as a promoting
mechanism to achieve safety when required, or otherwise other mechanisms are needed. For
the sake of clarity, we investigate here the pairwise race model and perform the analysis
for the N -player (N ≥ 2) DSAIR in the Appendix. Additionally, the situation where the
effects of a setback or disaster are no longer just personal is also reported in depth in the
Appendix.
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2. Materials and Methods
We first describe our AI race model, then provide details of the EGT method being used
for analysing the model.
2.1 Race Model Definition
The race for domain supremacy through AI is modeled as a repeated two-player game,
consisting of W development rounds (on average). In each round, the players can collect
benefits from their intermediate AI products, depending on whether they choose to play
SAFE or UNSAFE. Assuming a fixed benefit, b, from the AI market, teams will share this
benefit proportionally to their development speed. Moreover, we assume that with some
probability pfo those playing UNSAFE might be found out about their unsafe development
and their products won’t be used, leading to 0 benefit. Thus, in each round of the race, we
can write the payoff matrix as follows (with respect to the row player)
π =
( SAFE UNSAFE
SAFE −c+ b2 −c+ (1− pfo)
b
s+1 + pfob







The payoff matrix in Equation 1 should be interpreted as follows. When two SAFE
players interact, each needs to pay the cost c and they share the benefit b. When a SAFE
player interacts with an UNSAFE one the SAFE player pays a cost c and obtains the full
benefit b in case the UNSAFE co-player is found out (with probability pfo), and obtains a
small part of the benefit b/(s+ 1) otherwise (i.e. with probability 1− pfo). When playing
with a SAFE player, the UNSAFE does not have to pay any cost and obtains a larger share
bs/(s + 1) when not found out. Finally, when an UNSAFE player interacts with another
UNSAFE, it obtains the shared benefit b/2 when both are not found out and the full benefit
b when it is not found out while the co-player is found out, and 0 otherwise. The payoff is
thus: (1− pfo) [(1− pfo)(b/2) + pfob] = (1− p2fo)
b
2 .









































The payoff matrix in Equation 2 should be understood as follows. When two AS players
interact (and similarly for when an AS interacts with a CS player or when two CS players
interact), they complete the race at the same time after, on average, W development rounds,
thus obtaining on average B2W per round; moreover, these players always play SAFE in each
round thus obtaining π11 (see first row and first column in the payoff matrix given by
Equation 1) as the intermediate benefit per round. When an AS player interacts with a AU
player, the AU wins the race and obtains the full prize B while AS gains nothing. Thus,
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AS’s average payoff only comes from the intermediate benefit in each round, which is equal




W per round from the prize. Additionally, it obtains π21 as the intermediate benefit
per round. However, since AU plays UNSAFE in every round, a disaster may occur with






Similarly, AU’s payoff when interacting with CS follows from the fact that AU wins the race,
completing it, on average, in W/s development rounds, where it earns π21 in the first round
(since CS starts with SAFE) and π22 in the subsequent rounds (since CS plays UNSAFE
after the first round to reciprocate what AU played). Yet again, a disaster may occur with
probability pr. All elements in the payoff matrix in Equation 2 can be explained in a similar
fashion.
2.2 Evolutionary Dynamics in Finite Populations
We adopt here EGT methods for finite populations to derive analytical results and numer-
ical observations (Nowak et al., 2004; Imhof, Fudenberg, & Nowak, 2005; Nowak, 2006). In
a repeated games, players’ average payoff over all the game rounds (see the payoff matrix in
Equation 2) represents their fitness or social success, and evolutionary dynamics is shaped
by social learning (Hofbauer & Sigmund, 1998; Sigmund, 2010), whereby the most successful
players will tend to be imitated more often by the other players (Grujić & Lenaerts, 2020).
In the current work, social learning is modeled using the so-called pairwise comparison rule
(Traulsen, Nowak, & Pacheco, 2006), assuming that a player A with fitness fA adopts the
strategy of another player B with fitness fB with probability given by the Fermi function,(
1 + e−β(fB−fA)
)−1
, where β conveniently describes the selection intensity (β = 0 represents
neutral drift while β →∞ represents increasingly deterministic selection). For convenience
of numerical computations, but without affecting analytical results, we assume here small
mutation limit (Fudenberg & Imhof, 2005; Imhof et al., 2005; Nowak et al., 2004). As such,
at most two strategies are present in the population simultaneously, and the behavioural
dynamics can thus be described by a Markov Chain, where each state represents a homoge-
neous population and the transition probabilities between any two states are given by the
fixation probability of a single mutant (Fudenberg & Imhof, 2005; Imhof et al., 2005; Nowak
et al., 2004). The resulting Markov Chain has a stationary distribution, which describes
the average time the population spends in an end state. In two-player game, the average
payoffs in a population of k A players and (Z − k) B players can be given as below (recall
that Z is the population size), respectively,
PA(k) =
(k − 1)ΠA,A + (Z − k)ΠA,B
Z − 1
, PB(k) =
kΠB,A + (Z − k − 1)ΠB,B
Z − 1
. (3)
The fixation probability that a single mutant A taking over a whole population with
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describes the probability to change the num-
ber of A players by ± one in a time step. Specifically, when β = 0, ρB,A = 1/Z, representing
the transition probability at neutral limit.
Having obtained the fixation probabilities between any two states of a Markov chain, we
can now describe its stationary distribution (Fudenberg & Imhof, 2005; Imhof et al., 2005).
Namely, considering a set of s strategies, {1, ..., s}, their stationary distribution is given by
the normalised eigenvector associated with the eigenvalue 1 of the transposed of a matrix
M = {Tij}si,j=1, where Tij,j 6=i = ρji/(s− 1) and Tii = 1−
∑s
j=1,j 6=i Tij .
Risk-dominant conditions. We can determine which selection direction is more prob-
able: an A mutant fixating in a homogeneous population of individuals playing B or a B
mutant fixating in a homogeneous population of individuals playing A. When the first is
more likely than the latter, A is said to be risk-dominant against B (Kandori, Mailath, &
Rob, 1993; Gokhale & Traulsen, 2010), which holds for any intensity of selection and in the
limit of large N when
πA,A + πA,B > πB,A + πB,B. (5)
3. Results
We calculate the long-term frequency of each possible behavioural composition of the pop-
ulation, the so-called stationary distribution (cf. Methods), as this will reveal the action
preferences (i.e. behaving safely or not) of a finite set of virtual players within the context
of the DSAIR game defined above. This stochastic social dynamics of the population occurs
in the presence of errors, both in terms of errors of imitation and of behavioural changes,
the latter representing an open exploration of the possible strategies by the virtual partic-
ipants (Hofbauer & Sigmund, 1998; Sigmund, 2010). As can be observed in Figure 1, the
preference for the strategies AS, AU and CS changes for different lengths of the race. We
distinguish two regimes in the DSAIR that depend on the relationship between the number
of rounds W needed to achieve the ultimate benefit B and the revenue that can be achieved
at every round, i.e. b:
i) Early DSAI: This regime is characterised by the observation that the ultimate prize
of winning the race in W rounds strongly outweighs the benefits that can be achieved
in a single round, i.e. B/W  b. Being fast is thus a key driver here.
ii) Late DSAI: In this regime, DSAI will not be achieved in a foreseeable future, making
the gains at each round b, even when having to pay the safety cost c, more attractive
than the ultimate prize of winning the race B, i.e. B/W  b.
We observe that in the first DSAI regime, AU dominates the population whenever the
probability that an AI disaster occurs due to unsafe development (pr) is not too high (see
Figure 1c; also panels a and b, where pr = 0.6). In the second DSAI regime, AS and CS take
over (Figure 1a-b). When an AI disaster is more likely to occur due to unsafe developments
(i.e. large pr, see Figure 1c), AU disappears in both regimes.
Given the difference in behavioural preferences toward safety developments in the early
and late regimes, different kinds of regulation may be required. Since AI developments
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Figure 1: Different regimes of DSAI: when W is small (early DSAI) vs when W
is larger (late DSAI). Panels (a) and (b) show the frequency of each strategy,
i.e. AS, AU and CS, in a population (pr = 0.6). In the early DSAI regime, AU
dominates the population, while AS and CS outperform AU in the late DSAI
regime. The former observation is valid for pr values lower than 0.8, see panel
(c) (pfo = 0.1). For a high risk probability of disaster occurring due to ignoring
safety precautions (high pr), AU disappears in both regimes. The black line in
(c) indicates the threshold of pr above which SAFE is the preferred collective
action and below which UNSAFE is the preferred one. Parameters: c = 1, b = 4,
s = 1.5, B = 104, β = 0.1, Z = 100.
should at least provide a beneficial outcome for the individual developers and interested
users in society, we first investigate under which conditions they can achieve their ambi-
tions by acting safely, thus avoiding the risk of personal setbacks or shared disaster (see
Appendix). When the benefits of all making safe developments (ΠAS,AS) outweigh the ben-
efits of all doing things unsafely (ΠAU,AU ), i.e. when ΠAS,AS > ΠAU,AU , this goal can be
achieved (see Methods). The black line in Figure 1c depicts this threshold in function of pr,
revealing that there is a large part in the early regime (red area above the black line) where
regulation should be put in place to restrain unsafe development behaviour. On the other
hand, in the late regime (beyond 104 development steps), risk-taking should be promoted
as this will improve social welfare (area below the black line).
Figure 1 thus underlines the importance of knowing in which regime the race is operating,
since this would affect the type of regulation that one should introduce. In order to assess
these observations in detail, we carry out a more in-depth analysis in the following sections.
Early DSAI: only under specific conditions will regulation improve welfare
We first focus again on the analytical conditions under which ΠAS,AS > ΠAU,AU and then
determine when the safe and reciprocal strategies are more likely to be imitated as this
shows what behaviour to expect when participants can alter their actions in function of the
benefits they can gain.
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(a)  AU frequency
Figure 2: Early DSAI regime. (a) Frequency of AU as a function of the speed gained,
s, and the probability of AI disaster occurring, pr, when ignoring safety. In
general, we observe that when the risk probability is small, AU is dominant. The
larger s is, AU dominates for a larger range of pr. Region (II): The two solid
lines inside the plots indicate the boundaries pr ∈ [1 − 1/s, 1 − 1/(3s)] where
safety development is the preferred collective outcome but unsafe development
is selected by social dynamics. Regions (I) (resp., (III)) indicate where safe
(resp., unsafe) development is both the preferred collective outcome and the one
selected by social dynamics. Panels (b) (pr = 0.9) and (c) (pr = 0.6): transition
probabilities and stationary distribution in a population of AS, AU, and CS, with
s = 1.5. AU dominates in panel (c), corresponding to region (II), while AS and
CS dominate in panel (b), corresponding to region (I). We only show the stronger
directions. Parameters: c = 1, b = 4, W = 100, pfo = 0.5, B = 10
4, β = 0.1,
Z = 100.





That is, when the risk of a personal setback (pr) is larger than the gain one can get from a
greater development speed, then safe development is the preferred collective action in the
population, and vice versa.
Analysis of the second question, i.e. when safe (AS) and conditionally safe (CS) strate-
gies are more likely to be imitated, reveals that both are preferred over AU by the social





The two boundary conditions in Equations 6 and 7 divide the space defined by the speed
of development (s) and the risk of disaster (pr) into three regions, as shown in Figure 2a:
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(I) when pr > 1− 13s : This is the DSAI compliance zone, where safe AI development is
both the preferred collective outcome and fully safe or conditionally safe behaviour
is the social norm (see Figure 2b for an example: for s = 1.5 the condition becomes
pr > 0.78);
(II) when 1 − 13s > pr > 1 −
1
s : This intermediate zone captures a dilemma since, collec-
tively, safe AI developments are preferred, yet the social dynamics pushes the popu-
lation to the state where everyone develops AI in an unsafe manner. We will refer to
this zone as the DSAI dilemma zone (see Figure 2c for an example: for s = 1.5 the
condition becomes 0.78 > pr > 0.33);
(III) when pr < 1 − 1s : This is the DSAI innovation zone, where unsafe development is
both the preferred collective outcome and the one selected by the social dynamics.
The results visualised in Figure 2 remain present for different parameter settings as is
shown in Figure S4 in the Appendix.
As can be observed, in regions (I) and (III), the preferred collective outcomes are also
selected by the social dynamics. Whereas in the DSAI compliance zone, the high risk
of disaster motivates participants to adopt a safe strategy even when the final benefit B
outweighs marginal benefits per round. In the latter, the DSAI innovation zone, the benefit
of quickly reaching DSAI is everything and speed ensures that one arrives first, with limited
risk for a setback or even shared disaster (see Appendix). In terms of social welfare, i.e. the
average benefits spread over the population, the DSAI innovation zone produces the largest
benefits, especially for low risk and high speed combinations (see Appendix, Figure S13).
In the DSAI compliance zone, the social welfare is stable no matter the speed, yet lower
than in (III). Yet switching to unsafe actions here would only lead to a worse outcome, so
compliance to safety and ethical regulations is thus required.
Region (II), the DSAI dilemma zone, is somewhat peculiar as collective safe behaviour is
preferred, yet social dynamics selects for unsafe behaviour. As a consequence, social welfare
is lower than what can be seen in the two other zones. Regulation of unsafe behaviour
is thus required here as it will nudge the social dynamics towards safe behaviour and,
consequently, greater overall social welfare. Such regulation activities will have no effect in
the DSAI compliance zone and are potentially detrimental (in terms of the missed social
welfare) effects in the DSAI innovation zone. It is therefore essential to know, when the
time-scale to reach DSAI is short, what risks can be expected and what speed is acceptable
to avoid the DSAI dilemma zone and ensure a positive effect for society.
Looking back at the observation in Figure 1 that in the early DSAI regulation is nec-
essary, the current analysis reveals that this is only a necessity when risk and development
speed put the race in the DSAI dilemma zone since the effects would be counterproductive
in the two other zones. Yet stimuli to promote risk-taking in the DSAI innovation zone and
following safety protocols in the DSAI compliance zone are potentially useful when partic-
ipants in the race are unsure about the importance of following those actions, i.e. when
participants are still exploring and not imitating enough the most beneficial behaviours —
expressed by imitation strength β in our model (cf. Figure S4 in Appendix) — in those
zones.
Note that the boundaries established by Equations 6 and 7 are applicable for both
CS and AS when playing against AU. Thus, similar results are obtained if we consider a
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Figure 3: Late DSAI regime. (a) Frequency of AU as a function of the probability
of unsafe development being found out, pfo , and the probability of AI disaster
occurring pr, when the number of development steps to reach DSAI is large
(W = 106). AU has a low frequency whenever pfo or pr are sufficiently high. The
lines indicate the conditions above which safety behavior is the preferred collective
outcome (black line) and when AS and CS are risk-dominant against AU (blue
and green lines, respectively). CS is risk-dominant for a larger range of pr than AS
for small pfo , which is reversed for large pfo . The numbers refer again to the three
zones, i.e. the DSAI compliance, the DSAI dilemma and the DSAI innovation
zones. (b-c): transition probabilities and stationary distribution (pr = 0.4).
Against AU, AS performs better than CS when pfo is large, which is reversed
when pfo is small. Parameters: c = 1, b = 4, s = 1.5, B = 10
4, β = 0.1, Z = 100.
population of just two strategies AS and AU (cf. Figure S5 in the Appendix). Adding CS
does not change the overall outcome and conditions for safe AI development to be selected.
These results also remain unchanged when the risk of setbacks is not just personal, i.e.
being shared among the race participants (whether equally or not), as shown analytically
in the Appendix (also see Figure S10). The results are furthermore robust to changes in the
number of participants in the race. When considering the race among N development teams
(see Appendix), the main difference is that the upper bound of region (II) increases. That
is, the DSAI dilemma zone increases and the DSAI compliance zone disappears. Regulation
is thus required for a larger part of the speed-disaster space (cf. Figures S7 and S8 in the
Appendix). The reason is, the larger the group size the greater the chance that there is at
least one AU player in the group with other AS and CS players, who would then win the
development race.
Late DSAI: risk-taking as opposed to safety compliance may need to be
promoted
When DSAI is unachievable in the short term, AS and CS are the dominant social norms,
as was shown in Figure 1. However, when the probability of disaster is rather small, unsafe
behaviour would lead to a relatively greater welfare, yet overall much less than in the early
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DSAI regime (see Appendix). In Figure 3, one can again distinguish three zones, i.e. the
DSAI compliance, DSAI dilemma and DSAI innovation zones, based on conditions for which
safety behaviour is the preferred collective outcome and when AS and CS are risk-dominant
against AU (see the black, blue and green lines, respectively, in Figure 3).
In both the late DSAI compliance and late DSAI innovation zones, regulation is not
required as before. Although, as also pointed out in the previous section, stimulating
a faster acquisition of the required behaviour in those zones can potentially be useful.
In the late DSAI dilemma zone, regulation should be put in place to enforce behaviour
that improves social welfare. However, in contrast to the early DSAI where safety should
be promoted, in this late DSAI regime, unsafe behaviour (speedy innovation) should be
promoted to increase social welfare (see Figure S14 in the Appendix). This zone covers the
area in-between intermediate pr with low pfo, and low pr with intermediate pfo. In both
areas decreasing the level of monitoring leads to better social welfare. In the latter where
pr is low, decreasing pfo would move it into the innovation zone. In the former, despite
not completely removing the dilemma, decreasing pfo increases the frequency of AU and
the overall social welfare. Interestingly, high levels of detection risk removes the dilemma
zone, moving both areas into the compliance zone, as also can be observed in Figures S1
and S2 in the Appendix for other parameter settings, yet lower social welfare is obtained.
Note however that in the compliance zone where pr is high, social welfare is highest for
intermediate levels of monitoring (see Figure S15 in the Appendix).
As shown in the Appendix, the observations remain valid if, instead of pairwise interac-
tions, one considers a race with N > 2 teams in the late DSAI regime, i.e. all three zones
reappear. Moreover, when N increases, while the innovation zone size remains unchanged,
the DSAI dilemma zone again increases. Also in this case AU becomes the preferred collec-
tive outcome for a wider range of pr and pfo (see Figure S9 in the Appendix). Additionally,
when the risk of disaster is not just personal but is rather shared among the race par-
ticipants, we observe that the preference boundary between collectively safe and unsafe
behaviour remains the same yet the individual preference towards risky development in-
creases, i.e. the innovation zone becomes larger while the dilemma zone becomes smaller
and disappears (see Figure S11 in the Appendix). That is, shared risk in the late DSAI
regime improves the overall social welfare (by allowing more beneficial innovation to hap-
pen), reducing the need for regulatory actions to handle the late DSAI dilemma zone.
4. Discussion
This paper studies the dynamics associated with an alleged race for leadership in a domain
using AI and its associated technologies. The model applies to other innovation dynamics in
which the objective is to become the first to bring the technology to market. We focus on the
conflict between safety compliant and rapid risky development (Denicolò & Franzoni, 2010;
Abbott et al., 2009), assuming that only the actions of the participant influence the outcome
and that the time-window associated with this race is unknown. This problem is examined
through a multiagent/complex systems approach, adopting well-established methods from
population dynamics and EGT to achieve the goals. The adoption of practices originated
from evolutionary biology, when combined with social learning dynamics, allows us to grasp
the full complexity of the ecology of choices in innovation dynamics without a single pre-
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defined path. Akin to other evolutionary races, see e.g., the Red Queen Hypothesis (Leigh,
1973), individuals adapt their choices while facing ever-evolving populations of opponents.
As a result of this (open-ended) socio-technical dynamics, our analytical model describes
the long-term prevalence of each strategy in time.
Our results reveal that knowing the exact timing of reaching DSAI in a domain is not
crucial, only whether it can be achieved early or late, as this will influence what regulations
are potentially suitable. We identified three different DSAI zones in both the early and
late regimes, i.e. the safety compliance, the dilemma and the innovation zones. They
are respectively characterised by high risk, intermediate risk and low risk for personal as
well as shared setbacks. In the compliance and innovation zones, regulatory actions that
reverse the behaviour selected by social dynamics should be avoided, as they would be
detrimental to the overall social welfare. Stimulating, on the other hand, a faster acquisition
of the required behaviour in those zones can potentially be useful. In the dilemma zone,
however, regulatory actions promoting the collectively beneficial outcome are essential since
the behaviour selected by social dynamics goes against society’s interest, lowering social
welfare. In this DSAI zone the social dynamics is selecting for (undesired) behaviour,
requiring regulation of risk-taking in the early DSAI and safety compliance in the late
DSAI.
We show furthermore, both in the early and late regimes, that although the three DSAI
zones are determined by similar ranges of the risk for setbacks (pr), they differ in the
secondary factors that control the extent of these zones. While in the early DSAI, speedy
development (s) is everything, the race outcome in the late DSAI is mainly determined by
the efficiency and level of monitoring of unsafe behaviour (pfo). Although speed in the early
regime appears to handle some levels of disaster risk, it may lead participants to enter the
dilemma zone where individual interests counter societal welfare, and this area increases in
function of the number of participants in the race. As is shown in Figure S2, speed does
not influence the regions in the late DSAI regime. The risk of being detected actually limits
unsafe behaviour to the area of low risk situations. Yet more participants will increase
again the area (see Figure S9) as well as sharing the effects of a disaster (see Figure S11).
It appears thus that holding unsafe players responsible for bad outcomes of the DSAI race
will ensure, at least in the late regime, that unsafe actions remain limited. Moreover, the
presence of conditionally safe players, i.e. the threat that others may also start behaving
unsafely, limits the unsafe actions to lower risk areas.
Moreover, one should consider the possibility that the risk of being identified as an unsafe
player may not just affect a single development round, but may also have repercussions on
subsequent rounds, i.e. the unsafe player may also loose b for instance in all subsequent
rounds. As shown in the Appendix the results remain the same in early DSAI, while in
the late DSAI, the outcome is equivalent to the results one obtains when full monitoring
(i.e. pfo = 1) is in effect. Intuitively, longer consequences associated with being detected
is equivalent to having a higher probability of being detected in each round in the current
DSAIR model.
894
To Regulate or Not: Social Dynamics Analysis of AI Race
Lessons-learned box: This box summarises some essential observations that may
be useful to researchers working on regulating the use of AI in real-world appli-
cation domains.
Introducing novel technologies like AI-supported products in society is considered to be
lucrative for many stake-holders. This worldwide potential is used to urge people to transform
their business into one supported by AI and related technologies. In a competitive market,
and relative to the anticipated gain, persons or groups will be more or less eager to enter. As
there is a fear of missing out or not being in the lead, a race may be perceived by the stake-
holders wherein unsafe actions (no proper testing, hackable software, data leaks, etc.) are
considered acceptable risks in order to be first or get the biggest share of the pie. Regulatory
bodies and policy makers are aware and are proposing regulatory actions. Yet regulation may
have no effect or inverse effects when there is no complete understanding, nor data, of the
technology race. As put forward by the Collingridge Dilemma, the impact of new technology
is difficult to predict unless large steps have been taken in its development and it becomes
generally adopted.
To introduce effective regulations, a model is therefore required that can show the effect
of some of the main parameters driving such a race. Here, we identify the conditions in which
regulation may be required given the perceived risks and gains, and which type of actions,
risk taking or compliance to safety requirements, should be stimulated. Our idealised model
and associated analysis reveal that the timeline in which one can reach the supremacy in
a development race/competition in a given domain determines (a) what behaviour needs to
be promoted to ensure the maintenance of societal welfare; and (b) when regulatory actions
are required that promote benefits for society.
• For (a), we show that for an early/short-term timeline, safety compliance may need
to be promoted when risks of setbacks are intermediate, while in a late/long-term
timeline, innovative, risk-taking behaviour will improve the benefits to society (Figure
1c).
• To support (b), for both timelines, our analysis shows that only under the conditions
that define a dilemma zone (Figures 2a and 3a) regulation to promote the corresponding
behaviour as determined in (a) is necessary. Outside these regions, there is either no
effect or regulations can even be detrimental for advancements and society.
Uninformed promotion of compliance or risk-taking behaviour without knowing the time-
line and associated dilemma zones, may lead to unwanted consequences, such as disastrous
outcomes for businesses and society by promoting risk-taking in the early timeline and over-
regulation of innovation when enforcing compliance to extensive protocols in the late timeline.
It may be useful to first test regulatory ideas within the context of abstract models, or an
extension of it, to fully grasp what the effect of certain regulatory decisions.
The DSAIR model and associated analysis provides thus an instrument for researchers
interested in AI regulation and policy making to think about the supporting mechanisms
(such as suitable rewards and sanctions) (Sigmund, 2010; Sotala & Yampolskiy, 2014; Szol-
noki & Perc, 2013; Han, Pereira, & Lenaerts, 2015, 2019; Vinuesa et al., 2020) needed to
mediate a given race; for preliminary results, see our recent work in (Han et al., 2020).
In the early DSAI, controlling the development speed of AI teams appears essential. Yet,
policy researchers should carefully consider whether it will have the expected outcome,
i.e. whether the race is actually occurring in the DSAI dilemma zone. In the late DSAI,
monitoring was perceived to be crucial. Decreasing the level of monitoring can reduce the
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dilemma zone and increases social welfare, increasing speedy innovation. Intermediate lev-
els of monitoring lead to highest social welfare in the compliance zone. We summarised the
lessons learnt from our modelling and analysis in a Lessons-learned box.
In particular, consider the recently published (in February 2020) White Paper on AI
by the European Commission (European Commission, 2020), our study can be applied and
provide insights to shape the future EU regulatory framework on products and services
relying on AI (see Section C of the White Paper)—particularly, in determining the scope
of its application. The Commission considers a risk-based approach to determine when an
AI application is high-risk, in light of what is at stake, and therefore needs to be targeted
with regulatory actions. It focuses on whether the sector/domain and the intended use
involve significant risks. An AI application can be considered to be high-risk depending on
the sector it is being used in. Our results show that, in order to determine the scope of
regulation, the timeline of the technology to reach supremacy also needs to be taken into
account.
There are of course limitations to the current model and different simplifying assump-
tions were made, which will require further analysis. A first simplifying assumption is that
a higher speed can only be achieved by cutting ethical/safety corners. While it is a natural
one to make when agents are homogeneous in terms of their resources and wealth, it may
not remain true once agents become heterogeneous. For example, some teams may revise
their choices or act as role models more often than others (Santos, Pacheco, & Lenaerts,
2006; Santos, Santos, & Pacheco, 2008), or react to uncertainty in different ways, leading
to polarized behaviors (Domingos et al., 2020; Ross & Portugali, 2018). One may also con-
sider that stronger teams with more resources at hand or having more support from others
might ensure a greater speed than those without such advantage, even without cutting
ethical/safety corners. Under wealth inequality (see, e.g., (Tavoni et al., 2011; Vasconcelos
et al., 2014)), these stronger teams might be able to comply regardless of the competition
from weaker teams and still win the race. As the objective of the current paper is to propose
and examine an initial model, these issues were not examined and were left for future work.
One might also consider whether regulatory mechanisms like a speed penalty proportion-
ate to a participant’s resources would benefit society, since greater resources entail accrued
responsibility.
A second simplification, mentioned also in the introduction, is that safety compliant
actions do not lead to a disaster. Realistically, on the one hand, even when someone
aims to comply, they may make mistakes when implementing a certain safety or ethical
guideline, whether or not being aware of it. A consequence is that, disaster will always be
possible even for unconditionally compliant players, impacting thus all types in the same
manner. On the other hand, one could argue that, regardless of individual mistakes, SAFE
actions of highly regulated and safety conscious industries may also result in some unforeseen
failure. Including this possibility would require the introduction of an additional parameter
(pg), different from pr, that expresses some general risk of failure. This general risk will
nonetheless be lower than the risk after taking UNSAFE actions, as clearly the risk for a
disaster increases with how well safety regulations are followed. Moreover, as this general
risk affects every player type, meaning that the effect on their payoffs is equivalent, the
payoff matrix in Equation 2 would become (1−pg)Π. Thus, the introduction of this general
risk would be equivalent to having a scaled (namely, weaker) imitation strength (1−pg)×β.
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We have shown that our results are robust for different values of β, both analytically (see
Equation 31) and numerically (in the Appendix, Figures S1-5, S11 and S14). A weaker
imitation strength will decrease the frequency difference between all behaviour types, but
the results we presented regarding time-scales and behaviour zones, will remain unchanged.
In addition, safely developed products may also be misused by a third party. Such an
externality is not considered in the current idealised model, yet could be of interest for
regulatory agencies. Such errors (Nowak & Sigmund, 1993; Sigmund, 2010; Han, 2013;
Van Segbroeck et al., 2012) as well as participant heterogeneity (Hauser et al., 2019; Vas-
concelos et al., 2014) have been shown to play an important role in long-term interactions
in the context of social dilemmas, which can also be found in the current DSAIR model.
These additions can be explored in future work, either by ourselves or teams interested by
this model for their own purposes.
Next to these simplifying assumptions other limitations were introduced. On the one
hand, the effect of unsafe behavior on W has not been considered. It may well be that
accumulated detected unsafe behaviour, whether by a single player or jointly accumulated
by a number of them, may expand the time necessary to reach the DSAI, thus effectively
increasing W . Moreover, the time to reach DSAI in a domain may also be affected by
the trust that people have in AI techniques (Andras et al., 2018), even when deliberate
unsafe behaviour is not the issue. Rhetoric and framing of the AI development race and
how close it is to achieve the AGI might strongly influence the dynamics and outcome of
the race (Cave & ÓhÉigeartaigh, 2018; Baum, 2017; Cave et al., 2020). In future work,
such phenomena should be examined and introduced on top of the base model presented.
One the other hand, the model also did not consider that to achieve DSAI in some
domain, the results of multiple races may need to be combined. Here long-term targets like
AGI are considered to be achievable in one race. Clearly AGI will require solutions to mul-
tiple subproblems, which by themselves may be achieved in development efforts occurring
at different time scales. It is even more relevant to consider separate domains or sectors
given the fact that a technology might have different levels of risk depending on where it
is being used. This issue has been highlighted in the White Paper on AI by the European
Commission (European Commission, 2020), where a risk-based approach was considered
for determining the scope of regulatory actions to be applied. Future models of DSAIR
will thus need to consider that multiple DSAIR games to study what regulatory actions are
most beneficial for this kind of goals.
In conclusion, we have provided here a first plausible DSAIR model directly useful for
researchers interested in AI regulation and policy making to evaluate the risks associated
with the ongoing AI development and applications race, and have shown and analysed
its reasonably acceptable behavioural consequences. Our results indicate the crucial need
of clarifying the time-scale of digital innovation supremacy and the risks in relation to
ignoring safety and ethical precautions in speeding up innovation, in order to determine
suitable regulations of AI safety behaviour beneficial for all.
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Appendix A. Deriving Conditions for Viability of Safety Behaviour
When Safety Behaviour is The Preferred Collective Outcome
We derive analytical condition for which a population of players always following safety
precautions has a greater social welfare (i.e. average payoff) than that of a population of
players never following safety precautions, that is, ΠAS,AS > ΠAU,AU :
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Following the definitions of different DSAI regimes in the main texts, we simplify this
condition for the two regimes. First, in the early DSAI regime where B/W  b, Equation










= 1− b− 2c
b(1− p2fo)
. (11)
We can see that the development speed (s) is the crucial factor in the early DSAI regime
while it does not play any role in the late DSAI, where for fixed b and c, pfo is the only
influencing factor.
When Safety Behaviour is Selected by Evolution
We now derive conditions for which AS and CS are risk-dominant against AU, which are
the case if and only if, respectively,
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On the other hand, in the late DSAI regime where W → ∞ (i.e. B/W  c), they are
simplified to, respectively
π11 + π12 > (1− pr)(π21 + π22), (15)
π11 > (1− 2pr)π22, (16)
which are equivalent to, respectively
pr >
4c(1 + s)− b
(
2 + p2fo + (−2 + pfo(4 + pfo))s
)








Thus, for safety behaviour to be both selected and the preferred outcome, pr must satisfy
all the conditions in Equations (18), (17) and (11).
It is clear to see that the right hand sides of Equations (18) and (11) are decreasing
functions of pfo whenever b ≥ 2c. We now show that it is also the case for the right hand






4s+ p2fos+ pfo(3 + s)
)
− 4c(pfo + s+ pfos)
]
b(1− pfo)2(1 + pfo + 3s+ pfos)2
,
which is negative whenever b ≥ 2c because(
4s+ p2fos+ pfo(3 + s)
)
− 2(pfo + s+ pfos) = 2s+ p2fos+ p− pfos > 0.
In short, we have shown that for b ≥ c, the larger pfo the easier the conditions for the
safety behaviour to be both selected and the preferred outcome. Figure S2 validates these
observations numerically. Similarly, we also can show that these conditions are harder to
achieve the larger s is.











It is easily seen that the right hand side is greater than 1 iff b < 2c, i.e. this condition
would not be achieved (since pr ≤ 1) in that case. Assuming b ≥ 2c, since 4c(s+1)+2b(s−1)b(1+3s) >
1− (b−2c)(s+1)2sb >
c
b , it can be further simplified to
pr >
4c(s+ 1) + 2b(s− 1)
b(1 + 3s)
, (20)
which is the condition for AS to be risk-dominant against AU (see Figure S2 for an example
when s = 1.5).
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Figure S1: Across DSAI regimes. Frequency of AU as for varying pr and different
values of pfo and β: when W is small (early DSAI) vs when W is large (late
DSAI). β = 0.01, 0.1, 1 for top, middle and bottom rows, respectively. The black
lines indicate the threshold of pr above which SAFE is the preferred collective
action and below which UNSAFE is the preferred one (see Equation 9). In
general, we observe that AU is dominant for a larger range of pr in the early
than the late regime. Parameters: c = 1, b = 4, s = 1.5, B = 104, Z = 100.
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Figure S2: Late DSAI (W = 106). The curves/lines indicate the conditions above which
safety behavior is the preferred collective outcome (black ones) and when AS
and CS are risk-dominant against AU (green and blue ones, respectively). The
threshold for AS is greater than than CS when pfo is small, which is reversed
when pfo is large (Top row). (Middle and bottom rows) Frequency of AU
as a function of pr and pfo (bottom: s = 1.5) or s (middle: pfo = 0), respectively,
for different values of β. AU has high frequencies in regions below both the blue
and green lines, especially for larger β. Parameters: c = 1, b = 4, B = 104,
Z = 100.
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Figure S3: Late DSAI: Frequency of AU, AS and CS as a function of the probability
of unsafe development being found out, pfo , and the probability of AI disaster
occurring pr, when the number of development steps to reach DSAI is very large
(W = 106). β = 0.01, 0.1, 1 for top, middle and bottom rows, respectively. AU
has a low frequency whenever pfo or pr are sufficiently high. AS performs best
when pfo is large. Parameters: c = 1, b = 4, s = 1.5, B = 10
4, Z = 100.
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Figure S4: Early DSAI: Frequency of AU in a population of three strategies,
AS, AU, and CS, as a function of the speed gained when ignoring safety,
s, and the the risk probability pr. In general, we observe that when the risk
probability is small, AU is dominant. Also, the larger B and s, AU dominates
for a larger range. The two solid lines inside the plots indicate the boundaries
pr ∈ [1 − 1/(3s), 1 − 1/s] where safety development is preferred but non-safety
development is preferable (risk-dominant against CS and AS). The observations
are valid for varying the selection intensities: β = 0.001, 0.01, 0.1 for panels (a),
(b) and (c), respectively. Other parameters: c = 1, b = 4, W = 100, pfo = 0.5,
B = 104, Z = 100.
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Figure S5: Early DSAI: Frequency of AU in a population of two strategies, AS
and AU, as a function of the speed gained when ignoring safety, s, and the the
risk probability pr. In general, we observe that when the risk probability is small,
AU is dominant. Also, the larger B and s, AU dominates for a larger range. The
two solid lines inside the plots indicate the boundaries pr ∈ [1− 1/(3s), 1− 1/s]
where safety development is preferred but non-safety development is preferable
(risk-dominant against CS and AS). The observations are valid for varying the
selection intensities: β = 0.001, 0.01, 0.1 for panels (a), (b) and (c), respectively.
Other parameters: c = 1, b = 4, W = 100, pfo = 0.5, B = 10
4, Z = 100.
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Appendix B. Multiplayer AI Race
In this section we describe the N-team model of the AI race, extending the two-team model
in the main text. We then describe the Methods used for analysing multi-player games.
N-player AI Race Definition
The AI development race is modeled as a repeated N -player game, consisting of W devel-
opment rounds. In each round, the players can collect benefits from their intermediate AI
products, depending on whether they choose to play SAFE or UNSAFE. Assuming a fixed
benefit, b, from the AI market, teams will share this benefit proportionally to their develop-
ment speed. Moreover, we assume that with some probability pfo those playing UNSAFE
might be found out 1about their unsafe development and their products won’t be used,
leading to 0 benefit.
In a group of where k players choosing SAFE and (N−k) choosing UNSAFE, the payoffs
for players adopting SAFE and UNSAFE in each round of the race are, respectively
π(k)SAFE =
{
−c+ (1− pfo) bk+s(N−k) + pfo
b
k if 1 ≤ k < N
−c+ bN if k = N
π(k)UNSAFE = (1− pfo)
sb
k + s(N − k)
for 0 ≤ k < N
We consider a well-mixed, finite population of size Z, where players repeatedly interact
with each other in the AI development process, using one of the following three strategies :
• AS (always complies with safety precaution)
• AU (never complies with safety precaution)
• CS (conditionally safe, plays SAFE in the first round; then plays SAFE if everyone in
the group plays SAFE in the previous round and plays UNSAFE otherwise)




π(k)SAFE if 1 ≤ k < N
B




W (N − k)
+ π(k)UNSAFE
)










if 1 ≤ k < N
B














for 0 ≤ k < N
1. For simplicity of calculation, we assume that all the UNSAFE players will be found out or not together,
e.g. whenever investigation is done then they are found out; otherwise they are not.
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Figure S6: Different regimes of DSAI: early DSAI (small W ) vs late DSAI (large
W ), in multi-team game. Frequency AU in a population of the three strate-
gies AS, AU and CS in co-presence, as a function of pr and W . The black lines
indicate the conditions above which SAFE is the preferred collective outcome
and below which UNSAFE is (see Equation 21). Other parameters: c = 1,
b = 6, s = 1.5, B = 10000, N = 5, Z = 100, β = 0.1.
Analytical Conditions and DSAI Zones in N-team Interactions
First, the condition for ΠAS,AU (N) > ΠAU,AS(0), ensuring that a population of players
following safety precautions has a greater social welfare or average payoff than that of a
population of players never following safety precautions, reads
B
NW







It can be rewritten as
pr > 1−
B +W (b−Nc)
sB +W (1− pfo)b
. (21)





which is exactly the same as the condition for pairwise game, and does not depend on the
group size N .





It can be seen that, for this condition to happen in the late DSAI, it is necessary that
b > Nc. Moreover, the left hand size is an increasing function of N (compare the black
lines in Figure S9 for different values of N).
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Figure S7: Early DSAI zones in N-team interactions. Dotted lines indicate the con-
dition in Equation 26 for different values of group size N . The solid black
line indicates the condition in 21. The larger N the larger the region (II) and
smaller the region (I). In panels (b), (c): N = 5. Other parameters: c = 1,
b = 4, W = 100, s = 1.5, pfo = 0.5, B = 10
4, Z = 100.
Figures S6 shows the results for N -player games across different regimes of DSAI (i.e.
varying W ). Similar observation is obtained as in the pairwise game in the main text.
Risk-dominance of AS and CS against AU: On the other hand, AS and CS are




















i=1 1/i. Since HN > logN we can see that the left hand side of the inequality
approaches 1 for increasingly large group size, N →∞.
Thus, the two boundary conditions in Equations 22 and 26 divide the parameter space
s-pr into three regions, see Figure S7a: (I) when pr > 1 − 1(NHN )s : safety development
is both the preferred collective outcome and selected by evolution (see Figure S7b for an
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Figure S8: Early DSAI. Frequency of AU as a function of the speed gained, s, and the
probability of AI disaster occurring pr, when ignoring safety. Other parameters:
c = 1, b = 4, W = 100, s = 1.5, pfo = 0.5, B = 10000, Z = 100.
although it is more desirable to ensure safety development as the collective outcome, natural
selection/social learning would drive the population to the state where safety precaution
is mostly ignored (see Figure S7c for an example: for s = 1.5 the condition becomes
0.94 > pr > 0.33); (III) when pr < 1 − 1s , unsafe development is both the preferred
collective outcome and selected by evolution. Numerical results (cf. Methods below) in
Figure S7 confirm this division of the regions.
We observed that, the larger s is, the greater the threshold for pr. Moreover, a larger
group size leads to a larger region (II) – AU is selected for a larger range of the parameter
space s-pr. The reason is that, the larger the group size, the greater the chance that there
is at least one AU player in the group (with other AS/CS players), who would win the
development race.

















Methods: Payoffs Over Group Samplings
In finite populations, the groups engaging in a N-player game are given by multivariate
hypergeometric sampling. For transition between two pure states (small mutation), this
reduces to sampling (without replacement) from a hypergeometric distribution (Hauert
et al., 2007; Sigmund, 2010). Namely, in a population of size Z with x individuals of type i
and Z − x individuals of type j, the probability to select k individuals of type i and N − k
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      N = 5           N = 4           N = 3     
Figure S9: Late DSAI in N-player interactions. Frequency of AU as a function of pfo
and pr for different competition size N . The three lines indicate the conditions
as in the main texts (Figure 3). The size of the innovation zone is quite similar
for different N , but since the larger N the larger the region below the black line
(see also analysis), the size of the dilemma zone is increased. Other parameters:
c = 1, b = 6, s = 1.5, W = 106, B = 10000, β = 0.1, Z = 100.
individuals of type j in N trials is (Hauert et al., 2007)












Recall that Πij(k) and Πji(k) (see the section above) denote the payoff of a strategist of
type i and j, respectively, when the random sampling consists of k players of type i and
N − k players of type j (as derived above). Hence, in a population of x i-strategists and
(Z − x) j-strategists, the average payoffs to i and j strategists are (Hauert et al., 2007;
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Z − 1− x







Now, the probability to change the number k of agents using strategy i by ±1 in each time










with T+ corresponding to an increase from k tot k+1 and T− corresponding to the opposite.
As before, β expresses the unavoidable noise associated with errors in the imitation process.
Fixation probability and stationary distribution are calculated in the same way as in two-
player games.
Risk-Dominance Condition
An important analytical criteria to determine the evolutionary viability of a given strategy
is whether it is risk-dominant with respect to other strategies (Nowak, 2006; Gokhale &
Traulsen, 2010). Namely, one considers which selection direction is more probable: an i
mutant fixating in a homogeneous population of agents playing j or a j mutant fixating
in a homogeneous population of agents playing i. When the first is more likely than the
latter, i is said to be risk-dominant against j (Gokhale & Traulsen, 2010), which holds for







Appendix C. Disaster Scenarios: Personal vs Collective Risks
In the main text we consider that AI risk is personal, i.e. when a disaster occurs due
to omitting safety requirements, only UNSAFE players suffer. Here we consider that AI
disaster also affects co-players of the interactions. Namely, when a disaster occurs, the
UNSAFE players lose their payoffs as before but now their SAFE co-players would lose a
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fraction of their payoffs, denoted by γ (0 ≤ γ ≤ 1), with γ = 0 corresponding to personal
risk (as in the main text) and γ = 1 representing collective risk. So the payoff of AS when
playing with AU becomes, in two-team AI race: π12(1 − pr + pr(1 − γ)) = π12(1 − prγ).
Similarly for CS when playing with AU. Thus, the payoff matrix defining averaged payoffs








































Figure S10 shows the results for different values of γ across regimes. In the early regime,
little difference is observed when moving from completely personal risk (γ = 0, as in the
main text) to mixed risk (γ = 0.5) and collective risk (γ = 1). It is also easily seen (similar
to the analysis in Section 1 of this SI), the same conditions are obtained in this regime for
when AS and CS are risk-dominant against AU as well as when SAFE is the more beneficial
collective outcome.
In the late regime, a larger γ increases the frequency of AU (The condition under which
SAFE is the more beneficial collective outcome, does not depend at all on γ). They can be
written as follows, respectively
π11 + (1− prγ)π12 > (1− pr)(π21 + π22), (33)
(1− prγ)π22 + π11 > 2(1− pr)π22. (34)
which are equivalent to, respectively
pr >
π21 + π22 − π11 − π12











We can see that the right hand side of the condition of CS is an increasing function of γ,
and when γ = 1 (shared or collective risk), the condition for CS is the same as for when
SAFE is the preferred collective outcome.
Figure S11 shows the frequency of AU in the late regime and the corresponding condi-
tions obtained (see black, blue and green lines). We observe that increasing γ enlarges the
innovation zones (see the red parts) and reduces the dilemma zone.
Next, similar analysis can be done for the N-team AI race. The payoffs of AS and CS
when playing with AU is scaled by a factor (1−prγ) and all other payoffs remain the same.
Similar observations are obtained as in the two-player case. Namely, the same conditions
are obtained in the early DSAI regime for when AS and CS are risk-dominant against AU
as well as when SAFE is the more beneficial collective outcome. For the late DSAI, AU is
dominant for a larger range for increasing γ, see Figure S12.
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Figure S10: Different regimes of DSAI for different types of risk: when γ = 0
(top row); γ = 0.5 (middle row) and γ = 1 (bottom row). Little
difference is observed when moving from completely personal risk (γ = 0) to
mixed types of risk (γ = 0.5) and collective risk (γ = 1), especially in the
early regime. In the late regime, larger γ slights increases the frequency of AU.
Note that the conditions for which SAFE generates a larger social welfare than
UNSAFE behaviour (the black line in the top left panel), does not change with
γ. Parameters: pr = 0.6 (first two columns); c = 1, b = 4, B = 10000, β = 0.1,
Z = 100.
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Figure S11: Late DSAI: Frequency of AU when γ = 0 (top row); γ = 0.5 (middle
row) and γ = 1 (bottom row). The three lines (black, blue and green) are
the same as in the main text (Figure 3) (in the bottom line the black and green
lines are the same). Increasing γ enlarges the innovation zones (red parts).
Parameters: c = 1, b = 4, s = 1.5, W = 106, B = 10000, β = 0.1, Z = 100.
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Figure S12: Late DSAI for N-player race: Frequency of AU when γ = 0 (top
row); γ = 0.5 (middle row) and γ = 1 (bottom row). Increasing γ
enlarges the innovation zones (red parts). Parameters: c = 1, b = 6, s = 1.5,
W = 106, B = 10000, β = 0.1, Z = 100.
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Appendix D. Risk of Being Found Out With Longer Repercussions
We analyse here the case that the risk of unsafe development being disclosed induces that
the found-out unsafe player does not gain her share of b in the subsequent (u − 1) (where
1 ≤ u ≤ W ) rounds. That would clearly reduce the payoffs of AU when interacting with
others and increase their payoffs when interacting with AU.

























































(1− pfo) bs+1 + pfo(u+ 1− i)b
)










u ≤ 1. Thus, exactly the
same results are obtained in the early DSAI since changing u does not influence the chance
of winning the prizes for all strategies.
In the late DSAI (i.e. W → +∞), considering the limit of u/W  0 (when found out, a
significant portion of the the subsequent rounds are influenced), we have that Hu → 0 and
pfo(u+ 1)Hu → 1 (assuming pfo > 0). That has the same effect as having pfo = 1 since
π̃21 → 0, π̃22 → 0, π̃12 → −c+ b
Appendix E. Average Population Payoffs
In Figure S13 we show the average population payoffs, representing its social welfare. For
the early regime (see again Figure 1a in main text), in regions (I) and (III) of the s-pr space
the best possible average payoffs are achieved since SAFE (resp., UNSAFE) population is
the one generating a larger payoff than the other and they are also dominating (close to
100% frequency). So no additional mechanism/regulation is required that would change
this preferred outcome. In region (II), while SAFE is the outcome with the larger average
payoff, since UNSAFE dominates, a significantly lower payoff is obtained. Thus, regulation
is crucial to be put in place herein. Note that the highest social welfare is achieved for
low pr and high s (successful innovation), with the dominance of UNSAFE. A misplaced
regulation (to achieve SAFE) would destroy this significant social welfare gained through
innovation.
In the late DSAI regime, see Figure S15, a significant lower social welfare is obtained
in this dilemma zone, compared to the one in the unsafe zone, to which regulation can be
used to achieve.
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Figure S13: Average population payoff (social welfare). Top row: early (pfo = 0.5);
Bottom row: late regimes (s = 1.5). The lines indicate the conditions above
which safety behavior is the preferred collective outcome and when AS and CS
are risk-dominant against AU. Parameters: c = 1, b = 4, B = 104, β = 0.1,
Z = 100.
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Figure S14: Late DSAI: Average population payoff . Same parameter settings in in
Figure S2. The lines indicate the conditions above which safety behavior is the
preferred collective outcome and when AS and CS are risk-dominant against
AU. This welfare is significantly lower in the dilemma zone (below black line
and above blue and green lines), see also main text discussion. Parameters:
c = 1, b = 4, B = 104, Z = 100.
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Figure S15: Late DSAI: Average population payoff (social welfare) for varying
pfo and different values of pr. Note that the y-axes of the four panels are
not made homogenous (e.g. of the same value range), for a clear observation
of how social welfare changes as a function of pfo , for different pr. When pr is
small to intermediate, social welfare decreases with pfo; while when it is larger,
an intermediate pfo leads to the highest social welfare. Parameters: c = 1,
b = 4, B = 10000, s = 1.5, β = 0.1, Z = 100.
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